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1. What does it mean to allow human being to emerge as a locus of 
philosophical investigation? Any attempt to clarify this question is already to 
take up the concerns of a philosophical anthropology. From within the 
purview of this project a philosophical anthropology is that which address 
the question of the being of being human.1 Its concerns therefore are 
ontological rather than simply ethnological. And yet, it should not be 
thought that the question is a novel one. Indeed, the contrary is the case. 
The contention here is that the history of philosophy is marked by the 
continual engagement with and attempt to answer that question. The 
undertaking of this paper, while it concedes the centrality of that address, 
approaches the concerns of a philosophical anthropology from within what 
can best be described as the space created by the overlap of the history of 
theology and the history of the image.2 That space and its interconnected 
components are there to be recovered and transformed once the question of 
the being of being human is given as much an historical inflection as it is a 
philosophical one. This allows the historical to figure within the 
philosophical. Equally, it allows for a critical engagement that opens up the 
possibility for the reconfiguration of a philosophical anthropology.  
Programmatically, therefore, such an approach entails that the locus 
of investigation has to have a specific setting. Recovery and transformation 
demand it. The set of texts that comprise that setting here are the three 
treatises written by St John of Damascus between 726 and the early 740s CE 
and are published as Three Treatises on the Divine Images. Three 
interrelated preliminary points guiding the approach taken here need to be 
identified. The first is to note that part of what has to be demonstrated 
within this regional concern is that any attempt to engage human being 
under the guise of a form of neutrality, as if there were just an open field, 
is there in name alone rather than being real. Neutrality remains a feint, 
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despite appearances. In other words, inclusion and exclusion, processes 
which would work to stem the possibility of neutrality, from the realm of 
the human not only have historical force, they present the philosophical 
with an ineliminable demand. 
Secondly, one of the most persistent elements in any attempt to 
respond to the question of the being of being human posits a divide at the 
centre of human being. There are many examples. They may involve a 
divide in which the body is separated from the soul; or the animal (even 
human animal) from that which is properly human. As positions such as 
these are developed – and they will have internal contradictions and limits 
inscribed within them - other areas of concern are drawn into consideration. 
The one that is central here is the tradition in which the marker of human 
propriety is located in those unique elements which identify the specifically 
human by defining human perfectibility in relation to the identification of 
the human as that which is created in the ‘image’ and ‘likeness’ of God. 
Given this setting the question to be addressed concerns the meaning of 
‘image’. 
Answering this question, from one perspective, occurs at the limit of 
religion, indeed both question and answer may resist any straightforward 
incorporation into the domain of the religious. What occurs within the 
question is the identification of an element of human being that is there in 
excess of mere bodily presence. To the extent that, for example, ‘dignity’ is 
present as an addition to simple empirical presence with the result that 
slavery can then be understood as the elimination of human dignity that still 
maintains the body as extant, it follows that the critique of slavery in the 
name of human dignity will have recourse to the very structure of thought 
which, while conceding an initial equation of human being with empirical 
presence, refuses any final reduction of one to the other. The important 
point here is that once this position is sanctioned what is then conceded is 
the presence of a form of doubling that marks the being of being human at 
the origin. Within the history of theology this position is initially formulated 
in Genesis 1.26-7. However, it is presented in such a way that what is set in 
play, at the same time, is the problem of the icon or the image. No one 
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element can be addressed without the recognition of this original 
interarticulation.  
This founding position receives an important reformulation in Genesis 
2.7 within which what can be described as the logic of breath has become 
operative: “Then Adonai, God, formed a human from the dust of the ground 
and breathed into his nostrils the breath of life so that he became the 
human living being”. Breath does not just animate matter; it is that which 
establishes a distinction between the body as an empirical entity and what 
is identified here as the ‘human living being’. The presence of this logic 
complicates the way self-presentation is to be understood.3 
Nonetheless, the problem introduced by Genesis 1.26 has a twofold 
quality. In the first instance it pertains to what the terms ‘image’ and 
‘likeness’ mean in both the context of Torah and associated literatures, 
then in their rearticulation, firstly in the Septuagint and then in the Greek 
of the Christian Bible.4 In the second instance, the problem of the image 
becomes more emphatic once the concerns with the history of the image 
within the realm of art (or that which is positioned as art) are themselves 
confronted by the sense of actualization and presence that occurs with the 
claim that the figure of Christ is directly related to God. The presence of 
Christ is one resolution to the question of the status of the image. 
Moreover, once this setting is taken into consideration then Christology, 
itself unthinkable outside the logic of incarnation (i.e. not the ‘fact’ of 
incarnation, but the ensuing logic that secures it), rather than being an 
event within the history of religion, has to be understood as an event that 
ties together that history with both an accompanying concern with the 
icon/image and the continual engagement with a specific conception of a 
philosophical anthropology.5 The latter, the continuity of engagement, has 
to follow insofar as what it means to be human – the being of being human - 
is defined here by a relation to God where this is an ontological 
consideration, and is present in the form of an image having actuality. The 
corollary of the Christological is of course that there cannot be a conception 
of God without an accompanying image. The question of human being is 
located, as a result, within that setting. While greater argumentation is 
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needed what this positioning of the human yields is the third point of 
orientation, namely the Christological as marking the advent of a founding 
set of relations. The effective presence of the Christological means that to 
the extent that there is a philosophical thinking of the human that is bound 
by the image then it is situated within this nexus.  
The importance of this recognition is that what is then opened is the 
space for the counter measure. The counter measure is the interruption 
that stages an opening. However, it is neither arbitrary nor without content. 
In this instance, while retaining the possibility of thinking a philosophical 
anthropology premised on founding interarticulation in which the doubling 
within human still occurs, what is distanced is the subsequent position in 
which that doubling is taken to lead inexorably to the set up dominated by 
an imagistic conception of the image. Here what is interrupted therefore is 
the link between the already identified doubling and the actualization of 
the image as bound, a binding with its own necessity, to the Christological. 
The counter measure therefore opens the possibility that even though the 
founding doubling is retained, this occurs without there being the 
subsequent commitment to the incorporation of the image into a set of 
relations defined by both sight and immediacy. Integral to any undertakings 
that such an opening allows is the point noted at the outset concerning the 
impossibility of neutrality. (This will become the problem of the figure.)  As 
a result there would be the possibility of a philosophical anthropology that 
was defined neither by the image nor, as will be suggested further, by 
immediacy. And, it will also be the case that the feint of neutrality in being 
exposed would then allow for the inscription of relationality, power and 
difference as components integral to the development of that anthropology. 
Central therefore to understanding how this initial setting works, and thus 
identifying that which yields the possibility of a counter measure, is the 
presence of a founding set of relations between God, the human and the 
image. (Relations that follow from the third point of orientation – i.e. the 
Christological - noted above.) The question therefore is how, in that 
particular context, is relationality to be understood? As will emerge that 
 6 
conception of relationality is the problem of the economic, that is, the 
problem set in play by the use of the term oikonomia.6  
The presence of a set of relations, always already interconnected 
relations - oikonomia - defined by modalities of sameness rather than 
identity, occurring between God, the human and the image has two 
important consequences. The development of a critical engagement with 
the conception of a philosophical anthropology emerging from these 
relations has to engage them. Engagement is the precondition for any 
subsequent reconfiguration. The first consequence is the creation of a set 
up in which a series of elements cohere. Within this setting there are 
important connections. There are, for example, significant points of contact 
between the cosmological and the anthropological. What is accomplished as 
part of this process is the development of a specific configuration of human 
being. This is the first point. Then secondly there is the creation of a figure. 
The figure – in this instance it will be the figure of the Jew - is a mode of 
human being whose existence is created in order that it then be excluded. 
(The creation of the figure undermines the possibility of any sense of 
assumed universality or neutrality within the detailed development of a 
philosophical anthropology.) There is the important additional point namely 
that this exclusion is itself fundamental to the maintenance of the identity 
of that from which the figure is constructed in order then to be excluded. 
Consequently, the argument would be that the identity in question depends 
upon the excluded figure. Moreover, there is an important consequence to 
the creation of a figure. It brings with it a division in the precise sense that 
the life of the figure is not coterminous with those whose ‘lives’ have been 
configured. In the case that is pertinent here what endures is the non-
identity and thus the problem of the relation between the figure of the Jew 
and the lives of Jews. Figured being therefore is the construction of a form 
of existence that is always determined in advance of any one life. The 
figure creates and defines loci in which counter measures become possible. 
Understanding modes of figuration is essential to the analysis of the 
framework that incorporates the writings of John Damascene and the 
philosophical anthropology that it sustains, since they work through a 
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system in which oikonomia is inextricably bound up with creation of the 
figure of the Jew. Hence, it is a conception of the anthropological that is 
premised on a fundamental modality of exclusion. The analysis of this 
configuration has therefore an inescapable exigency.  
 
2. As noted at the outset the following encounter with central elements of 
the defence of the image/icon in the writings of John Damascene is located 
in how the interplay between the anthropological and the history of the 
image yields a specific conception of the figure of the Jew. In his De Fide 
Orthodoxa in the section entitled significantly On Man Book 11. 12) while 
‘image’ and ‘likeness’ reappear as qualities, what is important once 
relationality becomes the focus, is that the human is presented as already 
enclosed and as part of the world and thus as ‘a small world enclosed in a 
larger world’ (St John of Damascus, 1886). This reiteration of the 
microcosm/macrocosm relation sets in play the need to account for the 
already present relation between the worlds. Moreover, this structure is 
reiterated in terms of the connection between Christ and human being. 
Again, at stake here are both sameness and more importantly the 
immediacy of sameness. That immediacy is twofold. It is sameness as a 
relation without mediation, and secondly, it is a relation whose recognition 
(or observation) occurs immediately (i.e. occurring in the now of its 
happening). In other words, it is immediate because it is both without 
mediation and immediately there to be seen. In regards to the latter John 
Damascene argues is De Fide Orthodoxa that: “‘We’ attribute to Christ a 
human energeia because we perceive this economy in Christ”7 (59.24). In 
general terms microcosm/macrocosm is a mode of relationality in which two 
conditions obtain. Firstly, there is a both a possibility – and thus an 
envisaged actuality - of relation between the human and Christ. Secondly, 
this possibility is there to be seen. Not only must there be the relation, the 
relation in being present to the subject, being a subject is then delimited by 
that seeing. To be therefore is to see within the presence of this economy. 
To see the relation’s presence is thus to have been inscribed within it. 
Consequently, the state of not seeing, or being deemed to be the one who 
 8 
does not see, or, more emphatically not being able to see, creates the 
situation and thus the predicament of exclusion. The designation of being 
the one who does not see reinforces both the identity of the set of 
relations, equally the identities within it, and the continuity of the process 
of exclusion. As will became clear the Jew’s figured presence is an effect of 
the mode of relationality that is envisaged. As has already been suggested 
relationality is named within the tradition by the term oikonmoia. As 
significantly the macrocosm/microcosm relation is an object observed by a 
subject. Hence the following questions: Who observes? The text is clear: 
‘we see’ (θεωρουμεν). Hence the question: Who is the ‘we’ that perceives? 
The question of the ‘we’ is the question of how the being of being human is 
thought within such a context. In other words, the question  – Who is the 
‘we’? – depends upon an immediacy that excludes figured Jews.   
At work within the setting of this economy is the ‘word’ that has 
become flesh. (John 1:14 ) Rather than ask an abstract question - Is there a 
need to think the relation between word and image? – there has to be a 
more specific point of address. Certain formulations in the Christian Bible, 
here specifically John 19:5, mark the possibility of movement from word to 
human being and then to image.  Indeed, there is a corresponding exigency. 
The words were clear Ίδε ό άνθρωπος (ecce homo). The identification of 
Christ with human being, in which he is ‘this man’, has created the need to 
account for the very possibility of that movement. (A movement that is 
itself located within the development of a philosophical anthropology in the 
precise sense that what is named is human being as opposed to the divine.) 
As a result, it is the presence of Christ as a human being that creates 
thought’s predicament. Understood philosophically the exchange between 
the iconoclasts and iconophiles exists as a consequence of that event. While 
there may appear to be parallels in other traditions, notably in Judaism and 
Islam, this is not the case. For example, the extensive forbidding of images 
even decorative ones that can be found in the commentary on Exodus 20. 3-
6 in Mekhilta De-Rabbi Ishmael (the text itself was compiled mid-4th century 
CE) is contradicted both by reports of actual practices at the time though 
more importantly by the presence of artifacts in the synagogues of late 
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antiquity and the early modern period. Nonetheless, such a state of affairs 
cannot be interpreted as a clash between iconoclasts and iconophiles.8 
Simply put, they are indifferent to the incarnation. The general claim for 
which a detailed argument would need to be adduced is that the forbidding 
of images within Judaic thought is fundamentally different. For example, 
the interdiction announced in Deuteronomy 5:8, and which follows the 
identification of the problem of idolatry in Deuteronomy 4. 15-16, has to be 
read in the context created by Deuteronomy 4:8, in which the significance 
of the law as that which unifies a people and has a regulative force is 
advanced. The forbidding of images which is the refusal to identify God and 
thus the law with pure presence and thus immediacy occurs in a setting 
created by the primacy of the law as that which is there almost as a 
transcendental condition of human sociality and a locus of continual and 
thus mediated engagement. Within this setting, responding to the law is 
always mediate; while the response to the image is immediate. The final 
point to note is that is the difficulty of an identification of iconoclasm and 
its defense with acts of destruction as though acts of destruction could be 
generalized.9 The predicament is importantly different. A predicament is 
the way in which the self-conception of the time of writing produces what is 
taken to be the task.10  
The figure of the Jew located in the writings of St. John of Damascus, 
is located within and as part of that predicament. It is not just that ‘seeing’ 
and its connection to acts of ‘veneration’, a connection in which both 
cognitive and theological positions are incorporated within ritualistic 
processes, define the subject positions, that position is itself held in place 
by what is seen and thus warrants immediate veneration. The reciprocity 
here is fundamental.11 Therefore, it is essential to begin with the staging of 
the predicament, then to note the way subject positions are created, then 
to trace the interconnection between ‘theology’ and ‘economy’ as it occurs 
in his writings. In regards to the latter reference to Theodore of Studion 
(759-826 CE) and Cyril of Alexandria (378-444CE) will be of singular 
importance precisely because they allow for a deeper understanding of the 
connection between the theological and the economic. All these elements 
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account both for the creation of the figure of the Jew as well as what that 
specific mode of figuration brings with it. In other words, they locate the 
figure within the predicament that accounts for its production. 
A predicament, however, is not just the setting for an event. A 
predicament is a structure which is itself ideational and which makes 
thought possible. Informing any predicament is the time of its own 
occurrence, a predicament is self-temporalizing. At work within it therefore 
is a specific conception of time – what has already been referred to as the 
present conceived as the time of writing – that has itself a determining 
effect on what has become possible for thought. Note the following two 
passages from John Damascene’s defense of images: 
 
Of old, God the incorporeal and formless  was never iconized but now that God has 
been seen in the flesh and has associated with human kind, I depict what I have 
seen of God. I do not venerate matter, I venerate the fashioner of matter. (TDI 29, 
SJD 89). (My emphasis). 
 
For there is one God, one law given of the Old and New Testaments, who of old 
spoke  in many and various ways to the fathers by the prophets and in the time of 
the eschaton by his only-begotten Son (TDI 83-4, SJD 73). 
 
Present within these two passages is the question of time, the conditions in 
terms of which images/icons can be produced and the subject position that 
they then demand.  The response to that demand that occurs here is 
‘veneration’. (And it should be noted that ‘veneration’ is not an option. It 
defines the object, more significantly however it delimits the state of being 
a subject.) As the first passage makes clear there is an interruption in time 
that charges the present with an intensity that had not been there hitherto. 
John writes, ‘now that God has been seen in the flesh’ Hence, the 
conjecture here is that what is significant has two interrelated elements. In 
the first instance there is the force of the interruptive ‘now’ The second is 
the intrusion into this setting of what can be described as a structure of 
immediacy. Seeing is the immediate action. While there may have been a 
coming to see at work and thus seeing is there as a process, in the line cited 
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above there is the affirmation of what can be described as the ‘now’ of 
having seen. Sight allows for the materiality of the object – the object 
presenting matter’s creator - to be present. Presence here is presence to 
the eye (present to the eye) and thus an immediate presence.  
What occurs in the second passage is a further description of the 
‘now’. Again it is essential to note the moves occurring prior to the 
evocation of this ‘now’. In the case of this passage even though it opens 
with the a direct statement of both God’s presence and quality, (the latter 
takes the following form ‘(f)or there is one God’, a division still obtains. 
Firstly, there is the God who is present and who speaks of ‘old’ (speaking of 
course in the ‘Old Testament’) in ‘many and varied ways’. After which, that 
is to say ‘now’, there is the God (the same identical God) who speaks with a 
single voice through the ‘Son’. Speaking through the Son demands an 
immediacy of relation, which is present in terms of the immediacy of 
sameness. And here God’s having been positioned as there, always already 
there, in relation to the Son means that firstly God’s relation to the world 
has changed and thus the God of Exodus 31:18, the God who is described in 
Talmud (Berakhot), as the ‘giver of Torah’ (notein hatorah) no longer 
obtains and that secondly what counts as the world has also been 
fundamentally altered (Babylonian Talmud, Berachot 11b). Indeed, it is the 
world ‘not in heaven’ (Deuteronomy. 30:11) that the obligation and duties 
linked to law obtain.12 ‘Now’ that world no longer obtains.  
Part of the argument therefore is that within the Torah the giving of 
the law, its reception and any subsequent action all have an indeterminate 
relation to each other. ‘Now’ these modes of relationality no longer hold. 
Indetermination has become determination. Mediacy becomes immediacy. 
What obtained no longer holds ‘now’; this is another time. It is this other 
time that accounts for the absolute radicality of one of the claims leading to 
John Damascene’s evocation of Galatians 5:4.  The claim in question is the 
unequivocal assertion that ‘if you keep the law, Christ is no use to you’ (TDI 
71, SJD 106). To hold to the law, which means not to hold to the immediacy 
of the relation between Father and Son, is not just to retain the law; it also 
involves an exclusion from the ‘us’ and an identification of the law as literal 
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and thus as automatically binding. There is an addition and a simultaneous 
excision. Plurality and the need for interpretation, that which would be 
necessary were the law to be retained as necessary for ‘us’, and equally as 
constitutive of that ‘us’, even if what counts as constituted by that ‘us’ 
remains open and indeterminate, would have necessitated the presence of 
an original form of mediation. The latter have been overcome by the 
presence ‘now’ of a singular voice and the corresponding literalization of 
the law. ‘Now’, therefore, the problem of relationality is fundamentally 
different. ‘Now’, there is an overcoming in which God remains identical – it 
is still the ‘one God’ - even if the status of what is voiced, namely ‘the 
said’, is henceforth significantly different. The time of singularity, which is 
equally and simultaneously the overcoming of mediacy, is given a specific 
temporal designation. The singular and thus the immediate voice occurs ‘in 
the time of the eschaton’. To reverse the formulation, the position is that 
without the Son, the word of God remains mere word (hence the ‘problem’ 
of the legalism or the nomism of the Jews). As such, time would still be at 
the ‘beginning’.13 
What this encounter with the time sets in place is the need to 
account for the nature of the relations that occur within it; occurring ‘now’ 
‘in the time of the eschaton. It is not just that what takes place here is the 
insistent presence of the Christological, it is more significantly that the 
Christological, understood as a set of relations, cannot be thought other 
than in connection both to the overcoming of mediacy in the name of 
immediacy and thus as generating as a question the nature of the 
immediate relation between the Father and the Son in the first instance and 
then ‘veneration’ in the second. God is ‘venerable by nature’ (TDI 104, SJD 
135). Veneration is a mode of relationality and the designation of a subject 
position. It is the latter since to be a subject is to venerate that which is by 
nature venerable. Failure to venerate the failure to be a subject and thus to 
distance and refuse nature’s own exigency. If God is indeed by his ‘nature’ 
an object of veneration then his veneration must be immediate. That 
immediacy demands, given the necessity of God's absence, his presence via 
a relation, namely his presence in and through the relation to the Son. What 
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is demanded by that which occurs ‘in the time of the eschaton’, i.e. the 
time of immediacy and sight, is the staging of hierarchical relations of 
sameness. That hierarchy is the economic.14 The economic is integral to the 
production of the figure of the Jew. The stronger conjecture would be of 
course that this produces the Jew as figure to be excluded and that for the 
hierarchy to be effect and thus for the economy to continue to be operative 
that exclusion has to occur.  
 
3. The problem of relation is the problem of the economic. In the Second 
Refutation of the Iconoclasts, Theodore of Studion draws an important 
distinction between the theological and the economic. The setting pertains 
to what counts as the object of ‘veneration’. In Theodore’s dialogical text 
the ‘Heretic’ suggests that it is God who must be venerated and not a 
‘prototype’ let alone an ‘image’. In this setting the distinction between 
‘prototype’ and ‘image’ is already significant. The ‘Orthodox’ response is 
clear: “We are not talking about theology, sir, in which there is no question 
of resemblance or likeness but about the economic in which the prototype 
and the copy are seen. You must admit that the word has become flesh and 
become like us”.15  
What is the force of the distinction between the theological and the 
economic? It is clear from the start that the theological pertains to forms of 
separation and thus if the formulation can be reversed the economic 
pertains to ‘resemblance’ and ‘likeness’. (This is what was intimated earlier 
in terms of the distinction between identity and sameness. The terms 
‘resemblance’ and ‘likeness’ name modalities of sameness.) However, 
before the question concerning the distinction between the theological and 
the economic can be addressed a second passage needs to be identified. In 
this instance it comes from Cyril of Alexandria. Fundamental to it, given 
that the economic involves a hierarchical set of relations, is its evocation of 
the Pauline position in which both the human and the figure of Christ 
appear as ‘taking the form of a slave’. After all, Galatians 1:10 involves its 
author in a self-description as a ‘slave of Christ’. In this context Cyril of 
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Alexandria wrote: “… to say that he took the form of a slave expresses in its 
entirety the mystery of the economy in the flesh” (Cyril of Alexandria 1886). 
The use of the term ‘economy’ here is decisive. To which it should be 
added that Cyril also formulated this position at another point, this time in 
the second Christological Dialogue, maintaining the link to slavery, in terms 
of ‘the economy of incarnation (την της ενανθρωπησεως οικονομιαω) (Cyril 
of Alexandria 1886). In John Damascene slavery emerges in the description 
of ‘the first kind of veneration’ (TDI 104, SJD 135). To venerate is to be 
enslaved. The conjecture here is that what is significant is how the relation 
between slavery and the economic is understood. Indeed, the argument 
might be that one cannot be understood without the other. Being a subject 
and the economic are interarticulated. To go further, the claim would have 
to be that Mondzain’s position that theology is ‘believing without seeing’ 
while the economic is ‘believing while seeing’ is not simply true but had far 
greater implications than had been thought hitherto.16 In the precise sense 
that belief has become central and that the link between belief and sight 
redefine the relation to God in terms of immediacy. Before returning to the 
slave as a position within a structure of immediate relationality, some 
further elaboration of oikonomia is necessary. 
It is clear that the use of the term oikonomia and correlate terms in 
the Greek world pertains to the place that is regulated, modes of regulation 
and a hierarchy within the domain of the regulated.17 All three are at work. 
It can be argued that one of the most significant precedents for this use can 
be found in Aristotle’s evocation, in the Politics, of the distinction between 
the political, whose subject position is identified initially as the plethos, 
and then, almost in contradistinction, there is the domain of the οικος: 
 
Yet it is clear that if the process of unification advances beyond a certain point, 
the city will not be a city at all for a city essentially consists of a multitude 
(plethos), and if its unification is carried beyond a certain point, city will be 
reduced to family (oikia) and family to individual. (Aristotle 1932, 1261. 19). 
 
While many aspects of this formulation are important, in this instance what 
is significant is the mode of relationality and thus commonality that defines 
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the object of governance within the city, namely the ‘multitude 
(plethos)’.18 The contention here is that these relations have to be 
explicated in terms of the centrality of deliberation and judgement. 
Decisions are contestable. Mediacy prevails. The opposite is the case in the 
oikos. In that instance decisions have a form of inevitability attached to 
them. Deliberation is redundant and the relation between the elements has 
an inescapable hierarchy. It is the latter that comes to define the sense of 
economy that prevails in opposition to the theological. Recalling the 
terminology that has been used thus far it can be argued that the 
contestable decision, a decision linked to processes of deliberation, 
demands the primacy of both mediation and temporal (and spatial) 
openness. A setting that stands against the immediacy of hierarchical 
relations within the ‘house’.  
In De Fide Orthodoxa John Damascene will use the term oikonomia to 
describe the complexity of relation between the body and the soul. When 
taken together they comprise ‘the oikonomia of life/of what is alive’. (St. 
John of Damascus 1886, 59.21). Biological life and the life of the mind and, 
in the end, the life of the citizen are positioned within the economic. 
(There can no life – real life – outside it. Indeed there is no outside other 
that the one in which the figure is constrained to inhabit.) What will 
continue to insist within other uses of the term oikonomia is the primacy of 
relationality defined in terms of both sameness and obligation. Continuity 
will always displace a discontinuity demanding negotiation. For example, 
John Reumann has shown that the use of the term oikonomia in documents 
from the 2nd Century CE described a will (in the sense of testament) with its 
own form of related covenant. In other words, that such documents 
projected a relation to the future. (Again the presence of the relation can 
be viewed as necessary even if the content and nature of the relations were 
left as open questions. The obligation was retained (Reumann1959, 282-
292)). Reumann suggests in addition that ‘God’s ‘oikonomia’ also includes 
his plans for the last time’ (Reumann 1959, 291). The eschatological future 
therefore works within the structure of oikonomia. While it might seem a 
distinctly different sense of the term it is also linked to a form of 
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conciliation. However, the conciliatory involves the maintenance of the 
community. Hence in her examination of the term in the writings of Basil of 
Caesarea, Kathy Eden described oikonomia in his work in the following way: 
“Oikonomia entails making accommodation to the psychological needs of 
each individual believer in the service of a unified Christian community. 
Here as in Quintilian it subordinates the means to a greater end, a part to a 
whole” (Eden 1997, 44). The argument has to be that ‘accommodation’ is 
not the same as deliberation and that such a community in involving 
relations of sameness has had to incoporate the necessity of modes of 
exclusion and thus both the creation and the inscription of the figure.  
 
4. In the Three Treatises on the Divine Images there is a discussion of what 
he identifies as the ‘sixth type of image/icon (εικονος). One instance of 
which is comprised of the words written in books or the law on tablets. In 
either case what matters is the way the process of iconization occurs. Here 
the text is clear ‘letters iconize the word’ (TDI, 27, SJD 86; TDI 99, SJD 129-
30). What is there, words, letters and thus books, when taken as a totality 
are ‘seen by the sense of sight’. (TDI, 100, SJD 130). What is seen is there to 
be seen. What is important is the status of the letters. This is, of course, 
the question of the medium itself. The letters here would have the same 
status as the wood of the cross were both to function as an ends in 
themselves. John Damascene defends matter against the Manichean attack. 
However, the defense of matter has a specific quality. Hence the important 
claim made in the First Treatise: 
 
I do not venerate matter I venerate the fashioner of matter who became matter for 
my sake and accepted to dwell in matter and through matter worked my salvation, 
and I will not cease from revering matter, through which my salvation was worked 
(TDI, 29, SJD 89). 
 
Matter’s relation to God is what counts. (Matter is imbued with ‘grace’.) 
The subject’s relation to matter and thus to God is immediate. Immediate 
since what is excised is the medium – ‘I do not venerate matter’. There is an 
economy of relation and an economy proper to each of the relata. The 
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position attributed to matter, in which letters on tablets and in books are 
the law’s restated presence, are fundamental to the creation of the figure.  
In both the First and the Third Treatise the Jew is positioned in 
reference to Leontius of Neapolis’s Treatise against the Jews. In the first 
instance the charge against the Jew pertains to a false accusation, on their 
part, of Christian idolatry.  The passage in question is the following: 
 
If you accuse me again O Jew, saying that I venerate the wood of the cross as God, 
why do you not accuse Jacob of bowing in veneration over the head of his staff? 
But it is clear that in honouring the wood he did not venerate it, but venerated 
Joseph through the wood, just as we [venerate] Christ through the cross but do not 
glorify the wood (TDI 49, SJD 156). 
 
Later in the Third Treatise in a florilegium containing Leontius’s words the 
critique of icons is described as having been advanced by those who 
‘speak/prattle unjustly’. The additional point is that such critiques are 
advanced by a ‘tradition’ that is defined by a relation to ‘the law’. He then 
adds, in connection to this tradition, and thus to a definition given to it by 
the law, ‘it is not ours’ (TDI 130, SJD 178). (What is ‘ours’ is the domain of 
the ‘we’; the ‘we’ who see. Thus it is not the affirmation of place but the 
creation of place as a locus of inclusion and exclusion.) 
These are complex and demanding passages. Were it just material, 
the ‘cross’ as mere wood, then, the argument would be that the Christians 
were indeed idolatrous. That the ‘cross’ is not mere wood is because of its 
incorporation within a logic of relationality (i.e. within an economy). More 
significantly the cross becomes necessary because it is ‘through the cross’, 
that veneration is possible. The complexity emerges because John 
Damascene takes the Jews to be arguing that the ‘wood of the cross’ stands 
for God and therefore that both God and that which stands in relation to 
God can be thought outside the confines of this already structured 
economy. The separation would mean that matter could only ever be 
symbolic. The important point is that it would be as though there were a 
mediate relation between matter and God. A mediate relation does not just 
stand opposed to immediacy it stands opposed to both the immediacy of 
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seeing and thus the subject position that is created for and sustained by 
that immediacy.  Again, at stake here is the subject who sees. Exclusion and 
inclusion, components integral to the creation of the figure – recall the use 
of the pronouns ‘we’, ‘ours’ – cannot be separated from sight and 
immediacy.  
If seeing is primary and occurs within an economy structured and 
demanded by the actuality of the incarnation, itself the process par 
excellence of actualization – this is, after all, what it means to be in ‘the 
time of the eschaton’ – then what is deemed to stand counter to this is 
blindness, the refusal to see and thus the disavowal of that economy itself. 
However, these positions are created. They are figures. They construct the 
figure of the Jew. The counter measure therefore is not their refusal. In 
other words, it is not the rejection of the charge of blindness, legalism, 
nomism, etc. in the name of its op-posite.  As though the creation of a 
counter measure were simply a matter of counter positing. What stands 
counter to immediacy is an insistence on the mediate, on distance, and thus 
on interpretation. What, in fact, counters the temporality of immediacy is 
the temporality of deliberation and the potential infinitude of the 
contestable decision. If there is a term that names this temporality then it 
is reading.19 Reading allows for the creation of a different subject position 
and enjoins another sense of the material, one in which the book is not 
given within the process of its own ‘iconization’ and therefore is held apart 
from its presence as an image. Moreover, breaking the link to the image will 
not just be true of the book or of letters, it is equally true of the subject 
and thus of the equation of human being with that which can be given in an 
image. This position falls beyond the purview of iconoclasm (and thus of its 
assumed opposite, namely iconophilia.). The claim is rather that what such 
a positioning of human being opens up is the possibility of a philosophical 
anthropology that occurs beyond the hold of a specular oscillation between 
the positions of the iconodule/iconophile and the iconoclast. The suspension 
of this oscillation would allow an-other return to Genesis 2.7. With that 
return the claim would then be that the addition, that which allowed for a 
distinction to be drawn between mere life, which would be, for example, 
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the life of the slave, on the one hand and ‘the living human being’ on the 
other was no longer defined by the image. Rather, the recognition of that 
addition’s fragility would give rise to the need for its protection. The name 
given to the form that protection would take would be the law. The law 
would allow the suspension of figured being. Hence, what would then need 
to be argued is that rather than a concern with the problem of the image - 
and the question of the possibility of its being thought beyond the economy 
that delimited incarnation - the real opening that was there within any 
philosophical anthropology was an incorporation of the law, where law was 
understood as that which was regulative within the placedness of the being 
of being human, i.e. regulative within place understood as the always 
already present locus of human sociality. This links the anthropological and 
the theological. It does so, however, in terms that work to reposition a 
philosophical anthropology by bringing into relation with a political 
theology.  
Finally, therefore, what matters is the law. However it is not the law 
that is excised in order for the economy of the incarnation to be 
maintained. Rather it is a conception of law that always stands at a distance 
from immediacy. It is therefore the conception of law whose determination 
is given by the demand for justice. As a result there is the iconoclasm that 
continues to clear a space for law, allowing for a clearing as a locus of 
deliberation, a clearing taking on the quality of what Arendt might have 
understood by the ‘space of appearance’, clears away the image as the 
locus of immediacy and identification.20 The counter measure yields 
therefore a domain in which what figures is the possibility of deliberation 
and contestation between citizens whose identity is given by an original 
form of relationality rather than the creation of figures to be excluded. This 
is the other economy, the economy of original mediacy.   
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1 This forms part of larger project funded by Australian Reach Council (ARC 
DP160103644) entitled. Place, Commonality and the Human. Towards a New 
Philosophical Anthropology. I would also like to thank my colleagues 
Professor Constant Mews, Dr. Nathan Wolski and Dr. Raphael Dascalu for 
their generosity in discussing aspects of my work with me. Professor 
Emmanuel Alloa and Dr. Georgios Tsagdis also offered invaluable comments 
on an earlier draft.  
2 While it cannot be pursued here it should nonetheless be noted that even 
the evocation of the term ‘image’ raises a number of genuine problems.  
For example Philostratus’ (200-230 CE) major text is the Εικονες, though it 
is known by its Latin name Imagines, and can be taken to concern the 
relation between ekphrasis and the ‘plastic arts’. In St John of Damascus 
while the term ‘image’ occurs in the translation what is often at stake is the 
icon or the process of iconization. The question of the image is posed thus: 
ti esti eikón? (TDI 95, SJD 125). References to St John of Damascus are to St 
John of Damascus 2003, 1975, (henceforth TDI and SJD).  Even if the 
complication that emerge with German term Bild are ignored, it is still 
unclear that it is possible to evoke the term ‘image’ as though it were 
simply neutral. In fact the contrary is the case, terms such as ‘image’ are 
already located within a network of relations. Their analysis cannot ignore 
that initial setting.  
 
3 While it cannot be taken up here it needs to be noted that there is another 
version or permutation of the logic of breath that appears in the evocation 
of the katechon in 2 Thessalonians. Note the following: 
 
And then the lawless one will be revealed, whom the Lord Jesus will destroy 
with the breath of his mouth annihilating him by the manifestation of his 
coming. 2 Thessalonians 2:8 
 
Pursuing the varying permutations of the presence of ‘breath’ and thus the 
complexities within the logic of breath is an important task to be taken up 
in another context. 
 24 
                                                                                                                                                              
 
4 For an important discussion of the imitatio dei within the Jewish 
theological and philosophical tradition see Yair Lorberbaum 2015. 
 
5 Hence the claim by Dimities Pallis 2015, 173. The Christological is often 
overlooked as forming an integral part of philosophical positions that while 
having overcome what might be called the God of epistemology, though 
often this is no more than simple disavowal, retains the Christological as a 
structuring force. That this is the case in Hegel has been argued with great 
cogency by Emilio Brito. See Brito 1983.  
 
6 The term oikonomia names a set of hierarchical relations. It is also the 
term that plays a central role within any thinking, in this period at the very 
least, of the incarnation. While his work goes in a slightly different the 
writings of Emmanuel Alloa 2013a, 2013b have been decisive for the 
formulation of this paper. 
 
7 For an overview of the position of oikonomia in John of Damascus see 
Andrew Louth 2002, 144-179. 
 
8 Mekhilta De-Rabbi Ishmael 2004, 321-322.  
 
9 Though this is the challenge presented by Jaś Elsner 2017. 
10 I have used the term ‘predicament’ in a similar fashion to analyze the 
way Hannah Arendt understands the demands that the historical context 
makes on thought. The reciprocity between context and thought endures as 
fundamental. See Benjamin 2016b, 2017a. 
11 On the role of the cognitive in John Damascene see James R. Payton 
1996. 
12 While the question of how this conception of world is to be understood 
cannot be approached directly here an important beginning can be found in 
Berkovits 2010.  
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13 The same formulation - ‘in the time of the eschaton’ - can also be found 
in the De Fide Orthodoxa 56.53. Indeed the formulation occurs 10 times in 
Jean Damascene. In the Christian Bible it occurs twice though with different 
connotations in Epistle of Jude, 1 Peter I.1.20. 
14 Alain Besançon, in his extensive study of iconoclasm, also notes in regard 
to ‘the Damascene’ the inscription of the ‘image’ within a hierarchy. See 
Besançon 2009, 127. 
15 St Theodore the Studite. (1981,1866. Reference here is to page 353 of the 
latter. 
16 See the discussion of this distinction in Marie-José Mondzain 1996. 
17 It is also has a specific usage within Byzantine cannon law in which it, as 
has already been suggested pertains to a sense of compromise. Equally it is 
linked to a notion of management. However, the question of management 
has to be interpreted here in terms of relationality. For a general discussion 
of some of the issues raised by the term see: John E. Erickson 1997.  
18 The problem of the plethos or multitude as the both sovereign and the 
locus of governance gives rise to a range of important philosophical issues. 
Michael Dillon has argued that the ‘advent of Justice and the possibility of 
politics arise only because that plethos is ineradicable’. See Dillon 1999, 
157. While Daniela Cammack 2013 has problematized the automatic 
extension that the term might be given.  
19 On the complex relation between the immediacy of seeing and the 
mediacy of reading see, Benjamin 2016, 2017b. 
20 This is a key term for. It is defined in Arendt thus: 
 
The space of appearance comes into being wherever men are together in 
the manner of speech and action, and therefore predates and precedes all 
formal constitution of the public realm and the various forms of 
government, that is, the various forms in which the public realm can be 
organized. See Arendt 1958, 199. 
 
 
 
